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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

After the Defendant Lonnie L. Allen's probation ended in
this case, he filed motions in the District Court requesting that
(a) his admission to a probation violation be set aside,

(b) his

plea of guilty be set aside and the case be dismissed, and (c)
that his case file be sealed.

The District Court denied the

motion to set aside his plea of guilty and dismiss the case.
District Court also denied the motion to seal the case file.

The
1

This is an appeal from the District Court's denial of Mr. Allen's
motions.
B.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

In August 2009, Mr. Allen was charged by Criminal Complaint
with attempted strangulation and second degree kidnapping.

In

accordance with a plea bargain, Mr. Allen entered an Alford plea
to the charge of attempted strangulation on December 10, 2009.
The kidnapping charge was dismissed.
District Court sentenced Mr. Allen.

On January 7, 2010 the
Among other things, the

The District Court never ruled on the request that Mr.
Allen's admission to a probation violation be set aside.
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District Court placed Mr. Allen on supervised probation for three
years.
On September 9, 2010 a report of violation was filed in Mr.
Allen's case by the Idaho Department of Correction.

At a hearing

on November 16, 2010, Mr. Allen admitted to consuming a couple of
beers during probation.

On December 21, 2010, the District Court

imposed eight days of jail to be served on weekends.

Mr. Allen

otherwise remained on probation.
On December 2, 2011, Mr. Allen moved the District Court to
terminate his probation early, set aside his admission to the
probation violation, and set aside his plea of guilty and have
the charge dismissed pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2604.

The

District Court heard evidence and arguments from the parties on
December 20, 2011.

The State supported the placement of Mr.

Allen on unsupervised probation at that time.

The District Court

agreed and placed Mr. Allen on unsupervised probation.

Because

probation continued, Mr. Allen vacated the hearing as to the
other motions.
On July 2, 2012, Mr. Allen renewed his motions to terminate
probation, set aside the admission to a probation violation and
for relief under Idaho Code § 19-2604.
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The State did not object

and deferred to the Court.

The District Court ordered probation

terminated as of July 2, 2012 and asked Mr. Allen to submit a
memorandum regarding the two remaining motions.
the memorandum on August 6, 2012.

Mr. Allen filed

On August 27, 2012, the

District Court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order Re:
Defendant's Motion for Relief from Probation Violation and Motion
for Relief under Idaho Code § 19-2604 (the August 27, 2012
Memorandum Decision).

In the August 27, 2012 Memorandum

Decision, the District Court denied the request for relief under
Idaho Code § 19-2604.

As indicated earlier, the District Court

did not rule on the request to set aside the admission to a
probation violation.
On September 10, 2012, Mr. Allen requested the District
Court to reconsider the August 27, 2012 Memorandum Decision.

At

the same time, Mr. Allen also moved the District Court to seal
all records in the case pursuant to Rule 32(i) of the Idaho Court
Administrative Rules.

Memoranda in support of the Motion to

Reconsider and the Motion to Seal were filed with the District
Court on November 2, 2012.

The Court received evidence and

argument from Mr. Allen on November 20, 2012.
object to either request.

The State did not

The Court took the matter under
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advisement and on December 12, 2012 issued a Memorandum Decision
and Order Re:

Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration and Motion

to Seal Records

(the December 12, 2012 Memorandum Decision)

which both Motions were denied.

in

Mr. Allen filed a Notice of

Appeal of the December 12, 2012 Memorandum Decision on January
23, 2013.

C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Mr. Allen pled guilty to attempted strangulation pursuant to
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 u.S. 25
2009.

R. at p. 117-129.

(1970) on December 10,

The underlying facts which led to the

charge in this case were highly disputed.

The District Court was

presented with different accounts of the facts of the case.

The

PSI, the police reports, and the testimony at the preliminary
hearing in this case substantiate these different viewpoints.
Initially, the complaining party said that she and Mr. Allen
were verbally arguing when first approached by law enforcement.
She did not run to the officer screaming for help, or allege that
Mr. Allen had hit her, choked her, or strangled her.

In fact,

the complaining party actually said she was not hurt and the
Trooper testified at the preliminary hearing that he did not
notice any injuries on her.

Preliminary Hearing Transcript, p.

-4-

92 L. 12.

Mr. Allen was charged with driving without privileges

at the scene, not attempted strangulation or any domestic related
offense.
Subsequent to the arrest,

law enforcement discovered videos

in the trunk of Mr. Allen's car.

When confronted with these

videos, the complaining witness' version of the events changed.
Specifically, she claimed that she was grabbed under the chin and
that Mr. Allen's hand was against her throat.

After further time

to reflect, the complaining party's version of events and
injuries broadened, including injuries to her nose, arm, elbow,
along with her throat, neck, and jaw.

Report.

PSI and attached Police

However, at yet another time, the complaining witness

described the entirety of the event under direct examination as
1) involving only one hand; 2)
did not blackout.

she was able to breath; and 3) she

Preliminary Hearing Transcript, at p. 47-48.

Mr. Allen disputed these facts throughout the case,
summarizing that based on his Alford plea that "there really are
no facts to share.

.1 should have been more upfront in my

dating indiscretion to avoid such a reaction.
wish her the best."

PSI, at p. 3.

-5-

1 do feel bad, and

Mr. Allen successfully completed probation such that the
Court agreed to an early termination of probation.
213.

R. p. 212-

Mr. Allen requested the District Court to set aside his

Alford plea and ultimately dismiss the case due to his

rehabilitation and restorative progress on probation. R. at p.
194-195; Motion for Relief at p. 6-13; Motion to Terminate at p.
24-27; Motion for Reconsideration at p. 39-45.

The District

Court denied the request. R. at p. 258 & 291.
Mr. Allen requested the District Court to seal the case file
because the privacy interests of Mr. Allen and other people
predominated over any public interest in the case.

R. at p. 261-

262, 274-278; Motion for Reconsideration at p. 39-45.
District Court denied the request.

II.

The

R. at p. 282-292.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Was the decision to deny Mr. Allen's Idaho Code § 19-

2604 motion due to it not being compatible with public interest
despite his substantial compliance with probation an abuse of
discretion?
2.

Was the decision to deny Mr. Allen's motion to seal a

case file that contains highly intimate material about multiple
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parties and has caused financial hardship to Mr. Allen an abuse
of discretion?

III. ARGUMENT
A.

The District Court abused its discretion in denying
relief under Idaho Code § 19-2604.

The District Court failed to adequately address Mr. Allen's
argument in support of his request for relief under Idaho Code
§

19-2604.

This oversight shows the Court did not reach the

decision through an exercise of reason.
An abuse of discretion can occur in several ways.
court does not abuse its discretion if it
issue as one of discretion,

(1)

"A trial

recognizes the

(2) acts within the boundaries of its

discretion and applies the applicable legal standards, and (3)
reaches the decision through an exercise of reason."

State v.

Guess, 154 Idaho 521 (2013), quoting, Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146
Idaho 423

(2008).

The decision to grant relief pursuant to Idaho Code § 192604 is a matter within the discretion of the District Court.

Guess.

The relief need not advance or promote the public

interest; however,

it may not be contrary to or inconsistent with

the public interest.

Id.

Public interest refers to that which

the public or the community at large has an interest.

Dieter, 153 Idaho 730 (2012).
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State v.

While the Deiter decision gives no specific guidance for
what constitutes public interest, the Court mentions the Private
Attorney General Doctrine and how a portion of the doctrine's
test includes "the strength or societal importance of the public
policy indicated by the litigation," as a factor to consider.
Id.

The public has an interest in any criminal defendant being
successfully rehabilitated upon sentencing.

Rooted in this

public policy is Idaho Code § 19-2604, and the potential to have
a conviction set aside.

For years, the criminal justice system

has increased punitive measures.

These measures have not reduced

recidivism but have actually led to overgrown correctional
facilities, hampered state and federal budgets, and a growing
list of the public labeled as convicted criminals.

The stick

approach in the criminal justice system does not work without a
carrot.

Dismissal of a criminal charge upon successful

completion of probation provides the carrot after the stick is
used.
The 2011 amendment to Idaho Code § 19-2604 was designed to
give a defendant more of a chance to have his or her conviction
set aside.

As a consequence, it provides additional incentives
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to abide by probation. 2

In 2011, legal counsel for the Supreme

Court expressed to the Idaho Legislature that it provides aid for
defendants in making them productive and contributing citizens,
leading to an increase in employment and education opportunities.
As Deiter suggests, utilizing the Private Attorney General
Doctrine as guidance, it is important to society that offenders
be rehabilitated and afforded the opportunity to be successful in
life.

Not granting Idaho Code

§

19-2604 relief continues the

convicted criminal label, decreases the ability to be successful,
and may cause an individual to lose out on educational and
employment opportunities.

Without these opportunities,

convicted, yet rehabilitated, defendants may be forced into
unemployment, reliance on food stamps, or other government
financial assistance.

Placed in these strained situations,

recidivism will likely increase.

Recidivism causes increased

strain to the criminal justice system, which in turn places
further burden on society and the public at large with both
public safety and financial concerns.
In this case, the District Court declined to set aside Mr.
Allen's conviction for one reason only:

because it was not

compatible with public interest:

2 A further amendment was implemented on July 1, 2013
broadening the statute further.
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Of particular concern was the severity of Mr. Allen's
crime of attempted strangulation and the circumstances
surrounding it.
After considering Mr. Allen's actions
and the way he accomplished the crime, it was necessary
to impose a sentence that serves the primary objective
of sentencing, which is the protection of society, as
well as the related goal of deterring the commission of
similar violent crimes in the community by other
potential defendants who are similarly situated.
Although Mr. Allen may have made strides to become a
better citizen, in the discretion of the Court, it
appears that the severity of the crime and the method
of its accomplishment militates against either the
dismissal of the judgment of conviction or a reduction
to a misdemeanor.

R. at p. 290.
The public's interest is best served with the granting of
Idaho Code § 19-2604 relief in this case because Mr. Allen was
successful during probation and should be afforded the relief to
continue to be a benefit to society rather than facing the
stigmatic burden of being labeled a convicted criminal, and
facing the difficulties associated with the label.

See Motion

for Reconsideration at p. 39-45.
The District Court's conclusion that the severity of the
crime and the manner in which it was accomplished is sufficient
to deny the relief sought is not justified by the record.

The

District Court was presented with two versions of events on the
night of August 12, 2009.

The PSI, the police reports, and the

testimony at the preliminary hearing in this case substantiate
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these different versions of what happened.

However, the District

Court failed to acknowledge that the versions of the events only
became different at the point where the complaining party was
confronted with evidence that Mr. Allen had been sexually active
with other women at the same time he was in his relationship with
her.
It is important to note that initially, the complaining
party said that she and Mr. Allen were verbally arguing when
approached by law enforcement on the highway.

She did not run to

the officer screaming for help, or allege that Mr. Allen had hit
her, choked her, or strangled her.

In fact, the complaining

party actually said she was not hurt and the Trooper testified at
the preliminary hearing that he did not notice any injuries on
her.

Preliminary Hearing Transcript, p. 92 L. 12.

The Trooper's

initial investigation was simply to determine if there was an
intoxicated pedestrian on the highway.

He did determine that the

complaining party's blood alcohol content was .106.

Mr. Allen

was charged with driving without privileges at the scene, not
attempted strangulation or any domestic related offense.
Subsequent to the arrest, law enforcement discovered videos
in the trunk of Mr. Allen's car.

The complaining party was

confronted with the videos by law enforcement.

It was at that

time that her new version of the events was portrayed to the
-11-

police.

Specifically, she claimed that she was grabbed under the

chin and that Mr. Allen's hand was against her throat.

After

time to reflect, the complaining party's version of events and
injuries broadened, now including injuries to her nose, arm,
elbow, along with her throat, neck, and jaw.

(See PSI and

attached Police Report).
Mr. Allen's version of the events of that night differ
substantially and are actually more in line with the evidence and
the descriptions by law enforcement.

As described to the police,

one cannot say that Mr. Allen's version is not credible, while
the post hoc version of events of the complaining party is
credible, especially considering her initial statements to the
police that it was just a verbal argument.

Clearly, the

complaining party's version is the one that has changed.
Even assuming the complaining party's version of events as
true, this is not a case where the severity of the crime or the
method of its accomplishment are so egregious that relief under
Idaho Code § 19-2604 is inappropriate.

This is not a case

involving a victim who was held down and forcibly choked with two
hands in a violent stereotypical version of attempted
strangulation.

The entirety of the event was described by the

complaining party under direct examination that it 1) involved
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only one hand; 2) she was still able to breath; and 3) she did

Preliminary Hearing Transcript, at p. 47-48.

not blackout.

The District Court ignored the fact this case involved two
different versions of events and the circumstances that created
those different versions.

One version involved an intoxicated

party who initially describes to law enforcement that she had no
injuries and any dispute was only verbal, and later recants those
statements.

The other version involving Mr. Allen who presented

to the Court that based on his Alford plea that "there really are
no facts to share . . . 1 should have been more upfront in my
dating indiscretion to avoid such a reaction.
wish her the best."

I do feel bad, and

PSI., at p. 3.

Subsequently, Mr. Allen went on to successfully complete two
and one half years of probation.

The complaining party never

argued against the request to have the charge dismissed, nor did
the prosecuting attorney object on behalf of the State of Idaho.
By not addressing these arguments the District Court did not
reach its decision through an exercise of reason.

B.

The District Court abused its discretion in denying Mr.
Allen's Motion to Seal.

Mr. Allen argued that several provisions in Rule 32(i) of
the Idaho Court Administrative Rules were applicable to his
Motion to Seal.

The Court failed to adequately address these
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arguments, focusing solely on Mr. Allen's argument of economic
harm.

Failure to apply applicable law and address Mr. Allen's

argument is an abuse of discretion.

As such, this failure of the

District Court was an abuse of discretion because it
overemphasized a single factor while failing to address the
others.
Idaho trial Courts have the authority to seal case files
pursuant to Rule 32(i) of the Idaho Court Administrative Rules.
The Idaho Supreme Court has expressly held that Rule 32(i) is the
correct rule for a court to apply in a proceeding on a criminal
defendant's request to seal records.
869, 871

(2009).

State v. Turpen,

147 Idaho

Further, Idaho law states that the custodian

judge of the criminal file is invested with the discretion to
determine if a person's privacy interest in sealing a case file
trumps the public's interest.

Doe v. State, 153 Idaho 685

(Ct.

App. 2012; State v. Doe, 2013 WL 1960633 (Ct. App 2013).
In order to qualify for relief under Rule 32(i) a defendant
must show that some privacy interest dominates over public

-14-

disclosure of the file.

3

In addition, the Court must make a

written finding that:
1)

That the documents or materials contain highly intimate
facts or statements, the publication of which would be
highly objectionable to a reasonable person, or

(2)

That the documents or materials contain facts or
statements that the court finds might be libelous, or

(3)

That the documents or materials contain facts or
statements, the dissemination or publication of which
would reasonably result in economic or financial loss
or harm to a person having an interest in the documents
or materials, or compromise the security of personnel,
records or public property of or used by the judicial
department, or

(4)

That the documents or materials contain facts or
statements that might threaten or endanger the life or
safety of individuals, or

(5)

That it is necessary to temporarily seal or redact the
documents or materials.

Mr. Allen argued that the Court should have made a finding that
subsections (1)-(4) are all applicable.

The Court failed to

adequately address these arguments, stating only:
Mr. Allen's claim of economic harm is NOT so compelling
as to outweigh the overarching public interest in
disclosure.
.Mr. Allen has not presented this Court
with any 'exceptional circumstance' that would warrant

Online access to the Idaho Judicial Repository provides
employers, landlords, neighbors and total strangers with the
ability to view very detailed and intimate information about a
person.
Although the long term affects of access to this
information by anyone with an internet connection has not been
determined, it is an enormous individual privacy concern.
3
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the sealing of his criminal records.
While he believes
that his disclosure to prospective employers that he is
a convicted felon hurts his chances for employment,
whether or not the court record is sealed has not been
shown to adversely affect his employment capabilities.
R. at p. 291.

In this case, the Court's file contains documents with
highly intimate facts about, and statements made by, not only Mr.
Allen and the complaining party, but also about and by other
persons unrelated to this case whatsoever.

R. at p. 22-25, 27.

The publication and/or disclosure of those facts and statements
would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person, including
the other women mentioned in the file.

This is true because the

file contains material of sexually intimate activity, statements,
and details that neither Mr. Allen, the complaining party, or any
of the other named persons would want to be available for public
disclosure.

The Court's file and records in this case should be

sealed from disclosure and public inspection under Rule 32(i) (1).
In addition, the documents in the Court's file contain
statements that may be viewed as libelous.

Besides identifying

specific women, the police reports contain general statements
that it is unknown how many women were involved in the videos
seized by police.

There is also reference that Mr. Allen

allegedly has a sexually transmitted disease.
true.

See Motion for Reconsideration at p. 43.
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He denies that is
Because of the

false nature of these statements, the disclosure of the Court's
file should be viewed as libelous.

The Court's file and records

should be sealed from public disclosure and public inspection
under Rule 32 (i) (2) .
Furthermore, the documents in the Court's file contain
statements that the publication of which may reasonably result in
economic or financial loss or harm to Mr. Allen, the complaining
party, or others.

As previously outlined, the documents in this

file contain highly intimate sexual information.

While this

information may have economic and financial impact on Mr. Allen,
presently and in the future, the analysis under Rule 32(i) (3)
does not end there.

The complaining party, or any of the other

women mentioned in the file may reasonably suffer the same type
of harm because present and future employers have access to the
information in this Court record.

The Court's file and records

should be sealed from disclosure and public view under Rule
32 (i) (3).
Lastly, the documents in the Court's file contain statements
that may threaten or endanger the life or safety of not only Mr.
Allen, but others as well.

The police reports and search warrant

minutes in this case contain information of extramarital sexual
affairs among a number of persons who are not associated in any
way with this case.

The safety of those persons should be a
-17-

concern.

The public disclosure of the Court's file in this case

may put a number of people at risk to life or physical safety
because of the highly intimate nature of the information
contained in the file.

The Court's file and records should be

sealed from public disclosure and inspection under Rule 32(i) (4).
The Court failed to address three of the four arguments as
to why the Court file should be sealed pursuant to Rule 32(i) of
the Idaho Court Administrative Rules.

The failure to consider

not only the arguments, but the Rule itself, is an abuse of
discretion because the Court did not apply the applicable law,
nor reach its decision through an exercise of reason.

IV.

CONCLUSION
The District Court abused its discretion in denying Mr.

Allen's Motion for Reconsideration and his Motion to Seal
Records.

The December 12, 2012 Memorandum Decision of the

District Court should be overturned on appeal.
DATED this

\~

day of July, 2013.
AMENDOLA DOTY & BRUMLEY, PLLC
Attorneys for

By:
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